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I. INTRODUCTION
The headline in the local newspaper exemplifies the state of the
nation’s economy: “Safire Mountain community devastated by the
announcement that its largest employer, DeShai Manufacturing, will lay
off over one-third of its workforce.” DeShai Manufacturing’s (DeShai)1
operations, located in the small backcountry community of Safire
Mountain,2 have been a staple of the community’s economy for over
seventy-five years. Not only is DeShai the largest employer in the
community, it also pays the highest wages of any company within a one
hundred mile radius. For that reason, DeShai employs the breadwinner
of nearly every household in the Safire Mountain community. Safire
Mountain is a close-knit community consisting of approximately six
small country towns, all located within approximately fifty miles of
DeShai, with a combined population of approximately fifteen thousand.
It is no secret that the nation’s economy has been hit hard by the
fallout of the dot com failures, corporate scandals, and terrorist attacks.
In this economy, mass layoffs have become commonplace as companies
strive to keep respectable bottom lines or, worse yet, to stay out of
bankruptcy. DeShai, not immune from the effects of an economic
downturn, is struggling itself. Notably, the health of the economy on
both national and community levels depends on the ability of pivotal
companies like DeShai to stay afloat in these turbulent times. With
these concerns in mind, a new, aggressive chief executive officer (CEO)
has been brought in to secure the future of DeShai. The end of the fiscal
year is looming and the CEO will be giving an all-important pitch to
potential investors next month using the year-end numbers and profit
projections for the coming fiscal year. However, the CEO is concerned
that DeShai’s profit margin is not sufficient to secure the much-needed
financing required for the desired growth of the company. Seeking a
1.
2.
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quick fix for the company’s bottom line, the CEO meets with the Vice
President of Human Resources (VP HR) and directs her to reduce
payroll overhead going into the next fiscal year by implementing an
immediate reduction in force (RIF).3 The VP HR’s marching orders are
to reduce the current workforce of one thousand workers by one-third
within the next two weeks.
The VP HR knows a large RIF at DeShai will have a far-reaching
impact in the Safire Mountain community. The economy of Safire
Mountain is completely dependent upon the ongoing success of DeShai,
and any economic distress felt by DeShai will have a ripple effect on the
Safire Mountain economy and, ultimately, on the national economy.
The retail, services, and restaurant businesses within the community are
dependent upon DeShai to supply customers. What starts as a ripple will
swell into a tidal wave as DeShai workers become unemployed and stop
spending money and patronizing businesses within the community,
leading to the demise of Safire Mountain’s fragile economy. The effects
do not stop there; the RIF wave will impact the state and national
economies as well. The state’s economy will be impacted as a flood of
unemployment claims and state assistance claims are filed. Likewise, an
increase in demand for federal assistance will adversely impact the
nation’s overall economy.
In addition to the business and human aspects of conducting a large
RIF, the VP HR must also analyze the RIF’s legal implications. The
pain in the VP HR’s stomach intensifies when she discovers that this
will not be an ordinary layoff; she is contemplating a RIF that may
trigger requirements under the Federal Worker Adjustment and
3. DeShai is not alone in its decision to conduct a RIF. In fact, many of
America’s mega-companies, such as Kmart, Sprint PCS, Boeing (and related entities),
United Airlines, and Xerox, to name a few companies doing business in California, opted
to conduct mass layoffs in 2002. Employment Development Department, Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act Notices, at http://www.edd.ca.gov/
eddwarncn02.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2003). In 2002, the number of employees in
California laid off by these companies is as follows: Kmart—1654; Sprint PCS—1180;
Boeing—3629 (plus an additional 43 in January 2003); United Airlines—801 (plus an
additional 612 in January 2003); Xerox—335. Id. This information only pertains to
mass layoffs and plant closures affecting employees in California that triggered Federal
Worker Adjustment Retraining and Notification Act obligations. The U.S. Department
of Labor (DOL) reports that between January 2002 and May 2002 there were 8222 mass
layoffs resulting in 910,009 claims for unemployment insurance benefits. Mass Layoffs
in May 2002, NEWS: U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Bureau of Labor Statistics), June 27, 2002, at
1, at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/mmls_06272002.pdf. This is an increase
from 7434 mass layoffs and 880,347 claims during the same period in 2001. Id.
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Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act or Act).4 The mere utterance
of the words “WARN Act” is enough to send shivers up the spine of any
human resources professional.
Recognizing the dramatic economic effects that a layoff can have on a
community and its workers, Congress enacted the WARN Act to provide
protection to workers, their families, and the communities in which they
live in the event of a mass layoff or plant closing.5 The WARN Act
mandates that employers who meet specific requirements provide to
employees advance notice of planned mass layoffs or plant closings.6
Conducting a layoff is never easy, but now that DeShai must comply
with the WARN Act, the ordeal becomes even more difficult because the
company’s discretion and flexibility in conducting the RIF is greatly
hampered by its legal obligations under the Act.7
4. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109
(2000). The WARN Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to prescribe regulations
necessary to implement and carry out the WARN Act. Id. § 2107(a). The WARN Act
regulations, issued by the U.S. Department of Labor, are published in title 20 of the Code
of Federal Regulations at part 639. 20 C.F.R. §§ 639.1–639.10 (2002). As this
Comment will explain, a WARN Act RIF is vastly more complicated to administer and
may expose a company to more legal actions than a non-WARN Act RIF. Absent state
laws, collective bargaining, or policy obligations, an employer conducting a RIF that is
not covered by the WARN Act has greater discretion with regard to how much notice to
provide, what type of notice to give, who should receive notice, and how much
severance, if any, to pay the laid off employees.
5. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1. At the time the WARN Act was implemented in 1988,
workers were all too familiar with the term “layoff.” There was evidence that layoffs
were having negative public health effects and that advance notice of layoffs would
promote positive adjustment by workers. Richard W. McHugh, Fair Warning or Foul?
An Analysis of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act in
Practice, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 5 & nn.13–14 (1993). Regardless of the
cause of the layoff, communities feel the effects through decreased revenues and states
are impacted through increased unemployment levels. These effects drew significant
attention from Congress, and mandatory notice for plant closings and mass layoffs was
presumed to be the answer. See Christopher P. Yost, The Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act of 1988: Advance Notice Required?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV.
675, 675–76 (1989). The Safire Mountain community seems to be just the type of
community the WARN Act was enacted to protect, given that its economy depends
heavily on the health of a single employer.
6. 20 C.F.R. §§ 639.1–639.3. The notice, in theory, is to provide workers with
the time to find other employment or, if necessary, the time to obtain new skills or
training in order to successfully compete in the job market. Id. § 639.1(a).
7. It is worth noting that at least twenty-three states have implemented
counterpart statutes to the WARN Act that require advance notice to laid off employees,
and at least four states mandate severance pay in certain situations. ETHAN LIPSIG & MARY
C. DOLLARHIDE, DOWNSIZING: LAW AND PRACTICE 220 (Supp. 1999). Presumably due to
the current state of the economy, more states are becoming interested in adopting their
own versions of the WARN Act. California jumped on that bandwagon in September
2002 when Governor Gray Davis signed Assembly Bill 2957. See A.B. 2957, 2001–02
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002). On January 1, 2003, California’s mass layoff, relocation,
and termination law went into effect. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1400–1408 (West 1989 &
Supp. 2003). California’s “Baby WARN,” as it has been dubbed, has a broader scope
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This Comment examines the WARN Act from DeShai’s perspective
as the company prepares to conduct a WARN Act RIF, providing a
firsthand look at the real-world difficulties that DeShai experiences as it
attempts to decipher the language of the WARN Act to determine the
actions it must take to comply with the Act’s requirements. The
Comment focuses on how particular ambiguities in the statutory
language of the WARN Act present for employers compliance problems
that result in severe economic inefficiencies and discusses the
disagreement among the circuit courts as to how such ambiguities should
be resolved. In an effort to make the WARN Act more user-friendly for
employers, this Comment also proposes practical amendments that
should be implemented immediately. Specifically, Congress should amend
the WARN Act in three ways: (1) by designating the remedy afforded to
employees as a compensatory, make-whole remedy, (2) by including a
definition of back pay that will serve to make an employee whole, and
(3) by declaring that the calculation of back pay will be based on the
number of working days that occur during the violation period. These
proposed amendments are not drastic. Rather, they strike a proper
balance between promoting the purpose of the WARN Act and
providing statutory language that will serve to assist, rather than hinder,
an employer in its WARN Act compliance.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE WARN ACT
To fully understand the difficulties that DeShai faces upon discovering
that its planned RIF is covered by the WARN Act, the Act and its
requirements must first be examined. The WARN Act requires that an
“employer”8 planning a “plant closing”9 or “mass layoff”10 must provide
and effect than the Federal WARN Act and compliance promises to be even more
burdensome. California Adopts Plant Closing Law, LAB. L. EXTRA (Cal. Chamber of
Commerce), Oct. 17, 2002, at http://www.hrcalifornia.com/News_Services/Labor_Law_Extra/
View_Past_Issues/2002_Issues/October_17_2002/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2003). A state
counterpart statute may not necessarily be consistent with the Federal WARN Act, and
an employer is legally obligated to comply with both state and federal law. Sometimes a
state counterpart statute may apply even if the WARN Act does not. Therefore,
employers must carefully review all applicable laws before conducting a layoff. This, of
course, serves to further complicate a RIF.
8. An employer must first determine whether it is covered by the WARN Act.
Such a determination is based on the number of the employer’s employees. A company
that meets the WARN Act’s definition of “employer” is deemed a covered employer for
purposes of the WARN Act. The WARN Act defines an employer as “any business
enterprise that employs (A) 100 or more employees, excluding part-time employees; or
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the “affected employees”11 (or their representatives)12 with at least sixty
days’ notice of the planned employment action.13 In addition to
providing notice of the layoff to affected employees, an employer must
also give notice to the state dislocated worker unit14 and the chief elected
(B) 100 or more employees [including part-time employees] who in the aggregate work
at least 4,000 hours per week (exclusive of hours of overtime).” 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1);
see also 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(1). It is important to note that although part-time
employees are not counted for purposes of determining whether a layoff constitutes a
“mass layoff” under the WARN Act, such employees are entitled to receive WARN Act
notice in the event of a mass layoff or plant closing. 20 C.F.R. § 639.6(b). This is one of
the few relatively clear areas of the WARN Act. Yet, Arthur Anderson is currently
being sued by two part-time employees who claim that the company failed to provide
them with WARN Act notice when their employment was terminated in connection with
a mass layoff on April 8, 2002. Roquet v. Arthur Anderson L.L.P., 9 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) (19 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas.) 670 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2002).
9. The WARN Act defines a “plant closing” as:
the permanent or temporary shutdown of a single site of employment, or one or
more facilities or operating units within a single site of employment, if the
shutdown results in an employment loss at the single site of employment
during any 30-day period for 50 or more employees excluding any part-time
employees.
29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2); see also 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(b).
10. The WARN Act defines a “mass layoff” as:
a reduction in force which (A) is not the result of a plant closing; and (B)
results in an employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30day period for (i)(I) at least 33 percent of the employees (excluding any parttime employees); and (II) at least 50 employees (excluding any part-time
employees); or (ii) at least 500 employees (excluding any part-time
employees).
29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3); see also 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(c).
11. The WARN Act defines “affected employees” as employees “who may
reasonably be expected to experience an employment loss as a consequence of a
proposed plant closing or mass layoff by their employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5); see
also 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(e). In addition, any employee who reasonably may be bumped
from his position by someone on the RIF list, due to bumping rights under the
employer’s policy or under a collective bargaining agreement, is also covered as an
affected employee. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 639.3(e), 639.6(b). Accordingly, employers must
look beyond the RIF list to the workforce as a whole in determining which employees are
entitled to notice under the WARN Act, which makes the RIF process further complicated.
12. For purposes of the WARN Act, an employee “representative” means “an
exclusive representative of employees within the meaning of section 9(a) or 8(f) of the
National Labor Relations Act or section 2 of the Railway Labor Act.” 20 C.F.R. §
639.3(d). For all practical purposes, a representative generally will be the affected
employee’s collective bargaining agent or chief elected union official. It is important to
note that in some instances in which a collective bargaining agreement recognizes both
the national and local entities of a union, the employer is required to provide notice to
both the local and national union entities via their respective chief elected officers.
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042, 16,058 (Apr. 20,
1989) (providing supplementary information to the final WARN Act regulations).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a).
14. Pursuant to title 3 of the Job Training Partnership Act, each state established or
created a dislocated worker unit. See 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(k). Each state has published
information on where an employer may serve WARN Act notice. Usually this
information can be obtained from a state’s official website. See, e.g., Employment
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official of the unit of local government15 where the plant closing or mass
layoff will occur.16 DeShai has well over one hundred employees and,
therefore, is a covered employer for purposes of the WARN Act.17 As a
covered employer, DeShai must comply with the WARN Act in the
event that any RIF triggers the Act’s provisions. Because DeShai is
planning to reduce its workforce by one-third18 and at least fifty
employees will be affected, the RIF qualifies as a mass layoff that
triggers DeShai’s obligation to comply with the WARN Act.19
A. WARN Act Notice
To comply with the WARN Act, DeShai’s notice to its affected
employees must contain certain specific information, as detailed in the
WARN Act regulations.20 Along with notice to the affected employees,
Development Department, Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act:
How to Notify the State of a Plant Closing or Mass Layoff, at http://www.edd.ca.gov/
jtpawarntx.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2003). For a state-by-state listing of dislocated
worker units, see 9A Indiv. Empl. Rts. Manual (BNA) 595:911–16 (May 14, 2002).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(2). For purposes of the WARN Act, a “unit of local
government” is “any general purpose political subdivision of a State which has the
power to levy taxes and spend funds, as well as general corporate and police powers.”
Id. § 2101(a)(7); see also 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(g). In practice, the chief elected official of
the unit of local government where the mass layoff or plant closing is conducted is
usually the mayor. However, it is probably best to contact the office of the local
government to verify the appropriate official to receive notice. If an employment site
where a mass layoff or plant closing will take place is located in more than one unit of
local government, the employer must give notice to the unit to which it paid the highest
taxes in the preceding year. See id. § 639.3(g).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(2); see also 20 C.F.R. § 639.6.
17. See discussion supra note 8.
18. DeShai has 1000 employees. Thus, a one-third reduction in force will result in
334 employees losing their jobs.
19. See discussion supra note 10.
20. See Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042,
16,059 (Apr. 20, 1989) (providing supplementary information to the final WARN Act
regulations). WARN Act notice to affected employees must be written in language
understandable to the employees and must set forth, at a minimum, the following
information: (1) whether the employment action is expected to be permanent or
temporary, and in the case of a plant closing, a statement that the entire plant will be
closed, (2) the anticipated date of the mass layoff or plant closings and the anticipated
separation date of the individual affected employee, (3) whether bumping rights exist,
and (4) the name and telephone number of a company official who may be contacted to
obtain further information. An employer may also include in the notices any additional
information that may be helpful to the affected employee. 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(d). Such
additional information may include information regarding dislocated worker assistance
and, where the planned action is temporary, information as to the estimated duration of
the planned action. Id. If an affected employee has a representative, the notice to the
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DeShai must also provide separate WARN notices to the state dislocated
worker unit and the local chief elected official.21
After digesting the WARN Act requirements, the VP HR is alarmed to
discover that DeShai’s obligations under the WARN Act conflict with
the CEO’s demand for immediate reduction in payroll overhead. In order
to comply with the WARN Act, DeShai must give sixty days’ notice to
employees selected for layoff.22 Therefore, the CEO’s deadline to reduce
payroll overhead by the close of the fiscal year, which ends this month,
cannot be met if DeShai is to comply with its legal obligations under the
WARN Act. Not wanting to give the CEO this bad news, the VP HR
frantically scours the WARN Act in search of any loophole or
exemption that will excuse DeShai of its legal obligations for compliance.
B. WARN Act Notice Exemptions
Like many laws, the WARN Act provides for exemptions. However,
exemptions to the WARN Act are few in number and generally narrow
in scope.23 There are two types of exemptions to the WARN Act:
complete exemptions and partial exemptions.24
representative must set forth (1) the name and address of the employment site where the
mass layoff or plant closing will take place, (2) the name and telephone number of a
company official who may be contacted to obtain further information, (3) whether the
employment action is expected to be permanent or temporary and, in the case of a plant
closing, a statement that the entire plant will be closed, (4) the date of the first employee
separation and the anticipated schedule of employee separations, and (5) a listing of the job
titles of the positions affected and the names of the workers in those jobs. Id. § 639.7(c).
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a); 20 C.F.R. § 639.6. The purpose behind requiring the
company to send notice to the government is to allow the state dislocated worker unit to
promptly provide the affected employee with assistance. Id. § 639.1(a). At a minimum,
the government notices must include (1) the name and address of the employment site
where the mass layoff or plant closing will take place, (2) the name and telephone number
of a company official who may be contacted to obtain further information, (3) the
anticipated date of the first employee separation, and (4) the number of affected employees.
Id. § 639.7(f). The regulations provide for an optional, lengthier notice that must include
all of the information outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(f), plus information regarding (1)
whether the employment action is expected to be permanent or temporary and, in the case
of a plant closing, a statement that the entire plant will be closed, (2) the anticipated
schedule of employee separations, (3) the job titles of the affected positions and the number
of affected employees in each job classification, (4) whether bumping rights exist, and (5)
the name of each union representing the affected employees and the name and address of
the chief elected officer of each union. Id. § 639.7(e). However, as an alternative,
employers may provide the abbreviated government notice detailed in 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(f),
provided the additional information required by 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(e) is maintained by the
employer and made available to the government upon request. Id. § 639.7(f).
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a).
23. Washington v. Aircap Indus. Corp., 831 F. Supp. 1292, 1295–96 (D.S.C. 1993)
(finding that the WARN Act must be construed broadly and its exceptions construed
narrowly). For statutory exemptions to the WARN Act, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 2102(b), 2103.
24. A complete analysis of these exemptions is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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1. Complete Exemptions
There are only two instances in which an employer is wholly exempt
from complying with the WARN Act: (1) a situation in which the
employer closes a temporary facility or conducts a plant closing or mass
layoff due to completion of a project or undertaking,25 or (2) a situation
in which the employer conducts a plant closing or mass layoff that
constitutes a strike or lockout and that is not intended to evade WARN
requirements.26 The rationale for these complete exemptions is
grounded in whether the employee has a reasonable expectation of
continuing employment. In both complete exemption situations, the
employee has no reasonable basis for an expectation of continued
employment.27 Therefore, these are not situations for which the WARN
Act was enacted to afford worker protection.
Unfortunately for DeShai, the cost-cutting motives driving its RIF do
not provide a complete exemption from the WARN Act. The RIF is not
the result of a temporary facility closure or project completion and does
not arise out of a strike or lockout. Thus, DeShai’s hopes for any relief
from WARN Act compliance must be based on a partial exemption.
2. Partial Exemptions
In addition to the complete exemptions, the WARN Act offers partial
exemptions, provided certain requirements are met. If an employer
qualifies for one of the three partial exemptions, the employer may
conduct a plant closing or mass layoff with a reduced notice period
without incurring WARN Act liability.28 The first partial exemption is
See generally Sandra J. Mullings, WARN: Judicial Treatment of Exemptions, Exclusions,
and Excuses, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1209 (1997) (providing a detailed, although dated,
analysis of these exemptions).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 2103(1). No WARN Act notice will be required if the plant
closing or mass layoff is due to the closing of a temporary facility or the completion of a
temporary project and the affected employee clearly understood at the time of hire that
the employment was temporary and limited to the duration of the project. 20 C.F.R. §
639.5(c). Allowing this exemption makes sense because when employees know their
employment is temporary, they should not be surprised to find that they are suddenly
without jobs. In contrast, longer-term employees are more likely to be surprised if they
suddenly lose their jobs. Thus, the warning required by the WARN Act is more essential
to the longer-term employees’ ability to prepare for the impending job loss.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 2103(2); see also 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(d).
27. See Mullings, supra note 24, at 1213–19.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b).
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the “faltering company” exemption.29 The faltering company exemption
applies only to plant closings, not to mass layoffs, and the regulations
provide that this exemption should be construed narrowly.30 DeShai is
conducting a mass layoff, not a plant closing. Therefore, because the
faltering company exemption does not apply to mass layoffs, DeShai
cannot avail itself of this partial exemption.
The second partial exemption is the “unforeseen business circumstances”
exemption.31 This exemption applies when “the closing or mass layoff
is caused by business circumstances that were not reasonably
foreseeable as of the time that notice would have been required.”32 A
principal indicator that an event qualifies as an unforeseen business
circumstance is whether the circumstance is caused by “some sudden,
dramatic, and unexpected action or condition outside the employer’s
control.”33 The unforeseen business circumstances exemption is interpreted
more broadly than the faltering company exemption.34 However,
DeShai’s goal in conducting the RIF is to make the company more
attractive to potential investors. Thus, the CEO’s plan to institute costcutting measures cannot qualify as a “sudden, dramatic, and unexpected
action or condition outside the employer’s control.” Accordingly,
DeShai cannot take advantage of the unforeseen business circumstances
partial exemption.
The third exemption is the “natural disaster” exemption.35 When a
plant closing or mass layoff is the direct result of a natural disaster, such
as a flood, earthquake, drought, or storm, no advance WARN Act notice
29. Id. § 2102(b)(1); see also 20 C.F.R. § 639.9.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(a). In order to invoke the faltering
company exemption, an employer must satisfy a four-prong test establishing that at the
time notice was to be given (1) the employer was actively seeking capital or business, (2)
there was a realistic opportunity that the employer could secure the sought business or
capital, (3) such capital or business, if obtained, would have allowed the employer to
either avoid or postpone the closing, and (4) the employer reasonably believed in good
faith that providing sixty days’ WARN Act notice would have precluded the company
from securing the needed capital or business. Id.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(A).
33. 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b)(1). Examples of situations in which the unforeseen
business circumstances exemption may apply include “[a] principal client’s sudden and
unexpected termination of a major contract with the employer, a strike at a major supplier
of the employer, . . . an unanticipated and dramatic major economic downturn[,] . . . [and
a] government ordered closing of an employment site.” Id. An employer is not expected
to accurately predict the economic conditions that would affect demand for its products
or services, but it must exercise the same commercially reasonable business judgment as
would a similarly situated employer in the same market. Id. § 639.9(b)(2).
34. See Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042,
16,061 (Apr. 20, 1989) (providing supplementary information to the final WARN Act
regulations).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(c).
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is required.36 The Department of Labor has concluded that it may not be
appropriate to narrowly construe the natural disaster exemption.37
However, because DeShai’s RIF is not triggered by a natural disaster,
this exemption does not apply.
Assuming DeShai had been able to qualify for one of the three partial
exemptions, DeShai would be required to provide “as much notice as is
practicable” to the affected employees in order to avoid liability under
the WARN Act.38 This notice requirement applies even in the case
where notice can only be given after the RIF has taken place.39
C. Remedies for an Employer’s Violation
When an employer violates the WARN Act by failing to give the
required notice and does not qualify for an exemption, the company is
liable to the aggrieved employees for (1) “back pay for each day of
violation”40 and (2) benefits under any employee benefit plan,41 such as
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) health benefit
plans.42 An employer’s liability for each may extend up to a maximum of

36. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(c)(1)–(2). If an employer does
not qualify for the natural disaster exemption because the closing or mass layoff was not
a direct result of the natural disaster, the employer may qualify for the unforeseen
business circumstances exemption. Id. § 639.9(c)(4). This is because the natural
disaster could be construed as a “sudden, dramatic, and unexpected action or condition
outside the employer’s control,” which is a requirement of the unforeseen business
circumstances exception. Id. § 639.9(b)(1). Although advance WARN notice is not
required when a plant closing or mass layoff is a direct result of a natural disaster, the
employer must still provide some notice to the affected employees that the employment loss
was caused by the natural disaster. Such notice should include as much of the information
required by 20 C.F.R. § 639.7 as is available to the employer. Id. § 639.9(c)(3).
37. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification, 54 Fed. Reg., at 16,061.
38. 20 C.F.R. § 639.9.
39. Id. When the employer provides reduced notice, the notice provided must
include a statement of the reason for which reduced notice was given in addition to the
notice elements delineated in 20 C.F.R. § 639.7. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(3); 20 C.F.R. § 639.9.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1)(A). As discussed in Part V, infra, exactly what “back
pay” and “each day of violation” mean are areas of contention between the circuit courts.
However, this Comment proposes that back pay includes all pay and non-ERISA
benefits the employee would have earned during the violation period had he continued to
work, see infra Part V.A.2, and that “each day of violation” should be interpreted to
mean back pay for each working day that the employer failed to provide notice. See infra
Part V.B.2.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1).
42. Id. § 1002(1).
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sixty days.43 However, an employer’s liability for a WARN Act violation
shall be reduced by (1) any wages paid by the employer to the employee
during the violation period, (2) any voluntary and unconditional payment
to the employee by the employer that is not made pursuant to a legal
obligation,44 and (3) any payment the employer makes to a third party “on
behalf of and attributable to the employee for the period of the violation.”45
In addition, an employer is liable to the government for civil penalties of
up to $500 for each day of a WARN Act violation.46 However, the penalty
does not apply if the employer pays each aggrieved employee the amount
for which the employer is liable to the employee within three weeks after
the closing or mass layoff.47 An employer’s liability to an aggrieved
employee for a WARN Act violation may also be reduced if the
employer is able to convince a court that the act or omission constituting the
violation was made in good faith and that the employer had reasonable
grounds to believe that the action taken was not a WARN Act violation.48
The back pay, benefits, and civil penalties provided for by section
2104 of the WARN Act are the exclusive remedies for an employer’s
violation of the Act.49 This means that courts do not have the authority
to issue injunctions to prevent plant closings or mass layoffs.50
Although punitive damages for a violation of the WARN Act are not
available,51 a court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the
prevailing party in a WARN Act lawsuit.52

43. Id. § 2104(a)(1).
44. Severance payments made in exchange for an employee’s release of claims
cannot be offset against an employer’s WARN Act liability because the payment is not
unconditional. See Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las
Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 973
(2001) (holding that Sands could not reduce its WARN Act liability by severance
payments made to employees because the severance payments were conditioned on the
employees’ agreement to continue working until a date certain). Likewise, severance
payments made pursuant to an established severance plan also are ineligible for offset
because the employee is entitled to such payment regardless of whether proper WARN
Act notice was provided. See Tobin v. Ravenswood Aluminum Corp., 838 F. Supp. 262,
273 n.17 (S.D.W. Va. 1993).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(2)(A)–(C).
46. Id. § 2104(a)(3).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 2104(a)(4). Application of this “good faith” exception is often litigated.
See Ethan Lipsig & Keith R. Fentonmiller, A WARN Act Road Map, 11 LAB. LAW. 273,
310 (1996).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(b).
50. Id.
51. See Finnan v. L.F. Rothschild & Co., 726 F. Supp. 460, 464–65 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (finding that the exclusive remedy provision of the WARN Act “unmistakably
conveys that an additional remedy of punitive damages is not available to plaintiffs
under WARN”).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(6).
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The civil penalties imposed by the WARN Act and the potential for an
adverse award of attorneys’ fees provide an attractive economic
incentive for employers like DeShai to promptly compensate aggrieved
employees upon violation of the WARN Act. However, before the
benefit of this compliance incentive can be fully realized, employers
need clear guidance regarding the manner in which to calculate their
potential liability to aggrieved employees. Without such clarification,
the attractiveness of the compliance incentive is diminished. This is
because despite paying an aggrieved employee what the employer deems
to be its entire liability under the WARN Act, the employer remains
subject to the possibility that a court may find such payment insufficient,
thereby exposing the employer to liability for the civil penalties and an
adverse award of attorneys’ fees.
This uncertainty with respect to the calculation of an employer’s
liability actually creates a perverse incentive for an employer to play the
odds in the event the employer violates the WARN Act. For example,
instead of proactively attempting to satisfy liability for a violation on the
front end, an employer may decide that it makes better economic sense
to avoid paying aggrieved employees damages unless and until the
aggrieved employees come forward to challenge the employer’s failure
to provide proper notice. Playing the odds is attractive to employers for
several reasons: (1) where the employer gives only partial notice (notice
less than the full sixty days), the employees may not challenge the
failure to provide full notice, in which case the employer potentially may
escape any WARN Act liability,53 (2) an employer with a cash flow
problem may find the ability to delay payment of its liability to some
unknown point in the future to be attractive, in the hopes that when the
time arrives to actually pay the damages, the cash flow problem will
have been resolved, thereby making payment of the damages to
aggrieved employees easier,54 and (3) the employer may wish to take
advantage of time value of money principles.55 When employers play
53. This assumes that the government has not sought recovery from the employer
for the government penalties.
54. This assumes that the employer finds that the benefits of delaying damages
payments outweigh the additional government penalties that will be assessed against the
company for not paying aggrieved employees damages within three weeks after the
violation.
55. The time value of money principle basically provides that a dollar received or
spent today is worth more than that same dollar received or spent in the future. Dustin
K. Palmer, Comment, Should Prejudgment Interest Be a Matter of Procedural or
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these odds, it is clear that the purpose of the WARN Act is not being
served because aggrieved employees are not provided with the intended
economic protections in the event of a mass layoff or plant closing.
Thus, implementing clarification amendments that clearly define how
damages for violation of the WARN Act are to be calculated will both
eliminate some of these perverse noncompliance incentives and provide
employers with the certainty needed to serve as incentive for taking
preemptive action in the event of WARN Act violation.
III. COMPLIANCE WITH THE WARN ACT
Now that DeShai’s VP HR has determined that the planned RIF
triggers application of the WARN Act and has discovered that DeShai
does not qualify for an exemption, the VP HR must attempt to decipher
the ambiguous language of the WARN Act. After factoring in the civil
penalties and the potential for adverse awards of attorneys’ fees, the VP
HR determines that DeShai’s liability for failing to comply with the
WARN Act will exceed the amount that DeShai would pay in providing
the proper sixty days’ notice. In the current tight economy, or in any
economy for that matter, it makes good business sense to avoid any
additional exposure to liability whenever possible.
Given the CEO’s concern with the bottom line, the VP HR knows she
must ensure that the steps taken to comply with the WARN Act will
eliminate any liability. Balancing the company’s economic objectives
and legal obligations will not be an easy task. Even an employer with the
best intentions (and best employment counsel) may find that determining
the steps necessary to comply with the WARN Act is a difficult task, at best.
This is especially true in light of the broad application of the WARN Act.
A. Broad Application of an Ambiguous Statute
The WARN Act cannot be described as well-drafted legislation. It has
been criticized as a “clumsily drafted and unduly confusing statute”56
that is “imprecise, vague, [and] difficult to interpret.”57 Even the
Department of Labor has recognized that the WARN Act’s language is
Substantive Law in Choice-of-Law Disputes?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 705, 707 n.15 (2002).
Thus, by not immediately paying damages to aggrieved employees, the employer realizes
an economic benefit because it can use that money to pay other debts or invest the money
to earn interest until it is required to pay damages to aggrieved employees. Again, this
rationale assumes that the benefit realized from the time value of money is greater than the
detriment the company will experience by the assessment of government penalties.
56. Wilson McLeod, Judicial Devitalization of the WARN Act?, 44 LAB. L.J. 220,
220 (1993).
57. Lipsig & Fentonmiller, supra note 48, at 273.

724

CROSS.DOC

[VOL. 40: 711, 2003]

1/15/2020 1:37 PM

Failure to WARN
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

ambiguous and promotes broad application in order to afford the greatest
protection to employees.58 The broad application philosophy adopted by
the government further exacerbates the problems associated with an
employer’s attempts at compliance. For this reason, the adoption of the
WARN Act amendments proposed in this Comment is vital to
widespread employer compliance with the Act.
Moreover, the WARN Act regulations recognize that employers may
face uncertainty in applying the WARN Act. When an employer is
uncertain as to its obligations, the WARN Act encourages the provision
of advance notice in all such circumstances.59 Further, the WARN Act
and its regulations suggest that employers should provide notice even
when the notice is clearly not required by the WARN Act.60 Ultimately,
the ambiguity of the WARN Act causes more compliance problems for
The regulations,
employers than protection for employees.61
supplemental information to the final rule contained in the Federal
Register, and case law only serve to further confuse the issue.62 Thus, in
order to make the WARN Act more workable and to promote
compliance, amendments that provide employers definitive guidance are
desperately needed. Guidance will be especially helpful in instances
where an employer opts to use an alternative means of WARN Act
compliance. One such alternative means of compliance, the “pay-inlieu-of-notice” approach, may be a viable option for DeShai.
58. See 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(e) (2002). “[T]here are some questions and ambiguities
of interpretation inherent in the application of WARN to business practices in the market
economy that cannot be addressed in these regulations. . . . The Department encourages
employers to give notice in all circumstances.” Id.
59. Id. § 639.1(e).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 2106 (2000); 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(c).
61. See infra Parts IV, V (discussing the debate among the circuit courts regarding
whether the WARN Act provides remedies that are remedial or punitive in nature and the
method by which damages to an employee should be calculated).
62. The proposal in the WARN Act and supporting regulations that employers
should simply provide notice in all ambiguous situations is neither helpful nor practical
because it will very often place an unnecessary burden on an employer that could result
in devastating financial consequences if the company pays employees sixty days’ worth
of pay and benefits when it was not otherwise required to do so. Economically, it would
not be in the company’s best interests for the company to voluntarily subject itself to the
requirements of the WARN Act. Providing such notice could cost the company hundreds
of thousands of dollars, depending upon the wages of the workers. To ask a company to
voluntarily assume such an expense in a tumultuous economic climate is beyond reason.
In a community like Safire Mountain, that which is in DeShai’s best interests is also in
the best interests of the community because if DeShai suffers economically, then the
community similarly feels DeShai’s economic pain through falling revenues.
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B. Pay-in-Lieu-of-Notice as an Alternative Means
of WARN Act Compliance
Postponing the RIF in order to give the required sixty days’ WARN
Act notice would frustrate the CEO’s objective of entering the new fiscal
year with reduced payroll overhead.63 As an alternative to strict
compliance with the WARN Act, DeShai may consider providing payin-lieu-of-notice to the affected employees.64 Under the pay-in-lieu-ofnotice approach, DeShai would pay the affected employees upfront the
statutory WARN Act damages resulting from its failure to provide sixty
days’ advance notice. By choosing this approach, DeShai, in effect,
acknowledges its technical violation of the WARN Act and
preemptively pays to employees the full remedy available to them under
the Act. As noted above, if DeShai were to provide employees with the
appropriate pay-in-lieu-of-notice within three weeks of the violation,
DeShai would be relieved of liability for the civil penalties imposed for
violation of the WARN Act.65 In addition, because the remedies provided
to employees by the WARN Act (namely, back pay and benefits) are the
employees’ exclusive remedies, DeShai’s provision of properly
calculated pay-in-lieu-of-notice would relieve the company of all
WARN Act liability to the aggrieved employees.66
63. Timing problems are common when dealing with RIFs, and often the
organizational goals will conflict with an employer’s WARN Act obligations. Many
employers are reluctant to implement a RIF and will refrain from taking such action until
it becomes absolutely necessary. Therefore, once an employer decides that a RIF is
necessary, the decision must often be acted upon quickly to meet organizational goals.
This presents a huge problem when sixty days’ notice of the RIF must be given in order
to comply with the WARN Act. Thus, the pay-in-lieu-of-notice approach is attractive as
an alternative means of compliance with the WARN Act.
64. Lipsig & Fentonmiller, supra note 48, at 311–12. Other employers have used
the strategy of placing the affected employees on a paid leave of absence during the
notice period. This approach is often favorable when an employer does not wish to make
a lump sum damages payment to aggrieved employees and is concerned that employees
will engage in sabotage during the notice period if allowed to remain on the job. Id.
This approach may also be a good option when an employer cannot calculate with
certainty its WARN Act damages due to lack of case law interpreting the ambiguities in
the WARN Act as to such damages calculations. Under the paid leave of absence
approach, employees stay on the payroll and continue to receive their usual pay and
benefits but are relieved of their duties. Although this approach does not guarantee that a
court will find full WARN Act compliance, the Fifth Circuit has determined that an
employer who places affected employees on a fully paid, excused leave of absence
during the sixty day notice period has complied with the underlying purpose of the
WARN Act. Williams v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 23 F.3d 930, 935 (5th Cir. 1994)
(“WARN was intended to provide employees with notice so that they could adjust to the
layoff and locate other work. Fully-paid excused leave complies with these purposes.”).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(3); see also Lipsig & Fentonmiller, supra note 48, at 311–12.
66. See Ass’n of W. Pulp & Paper Workers v. Grays Harbor Paper Co., No. C935226B, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13094, at *26 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 1994) (allowing an
employer to offset its WARN Act liability with the voluntary and unconditional
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The pay-in-lieu-of-notice approach may prove to be an attractive
alternative for DeShai because it would allow the company to terminate
the employees immediately and pay damages during the current fiscal
year, thereby allowing projections for the next fiscal year to be based on
the reduced payroll overhead figure that the CEO is seeking. However,
the disadvantage of this approach is that it is nearly impossible for
employers to calculate the proper pay-in-lieu-of-notice. The reason for
this difficulty is threefold: (1) there is ambiguity regarding whether the
WARN Act provides for a compensatory “make-whole” remedy67 or a
punitive remedy,68 (2) there is disagreement among the circuit courts as
to what is included in “back pay” for purposes of calculating WARN Act
damages,69 and (3) the circuit courts are split with regard to whether the
calculation of damages is based on the number of calendar or working
days during the violation period.70 Thus, until either the U.S. Supreme
Court resolves the split between the circuits, which is unlikely to happen
anytime soon,71 or Congress amends the WARN Act to clarify the
payments consisting of full compensation and benefits for the sixty day notice period
that the employer has made to affected employees); see also Lipsig & Fentonmiller,
supra note 48, at 311 (“The WARN Act does not explicitly state that an employer may
give employees pay-in-lieu-of-notice, but voluntarily doing so can totally eliminate any
WARN Act liability the employer may have.”).
67. The terms “remedial” and “make-whole” will be used interchangeably in this
Comment, in a way that is consistent with the terminology used by the courts. See Local
Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d
1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting “the primary purpose of the Act is remedial” and that
“‘back pay’ under the WARN Act is a make-whole compensatory remedy”), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 973 (2001)
68. See infra Part IV.
69. See infra Part V.A.
70. See infra Part V.B; see also Lipsig & Fentonmiller, supra note 48, at 311–12;
Jeffrey J. Turner, Comment, Damages Under the Workers Adjustment and Retraining
Act (WARN): Why Damages Cannot be Based on Calendar Days, 12 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV. 197, 203–08 (1995).
71. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly passed on the opportunity to resolve
the split in the circuit courts. See, e.g., Las Vegas Sands, 244 F.3d at 1158–59, cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 973 (2001); Burns v. Stone Forest Indus., 147 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th
Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1040 (1998); Breedlove v. Earthgrains Baking Cos.,
140 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 921 (1998); Carpenters Dist.
Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1283–86 (5th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); United Steelworkers of America v. North Star Steel Co., 5
F.3d 39, 42–43 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1114 (1994). There are many
reasons that could be behind the U.S. Supreme Court’s denials of certiorari. For
example, the Court may find the issue relatively unimportant or may want the issue and
analysis to develop further among the circuit courts before weighing in on the matter.
Whatever the reason for the Court’s continual denials to resolve this issue, the
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definition of back pay and whether the calculation of such damages is
based on the number of working days or calendar days that fall within the
violation period, an employer cannot be sure that adopting the pay-in-lieuof-notice approach will completely extinguish its WARN Act liability.
IV. THE WARN ACT PROVIDES FOR A COMPENSATORY,
“MAKE-WHOLE” REMEDY
A core problematic area of ambiguity in the WARN Act is its
provision for an employee’s remedy of back pay and benefits in the
event of an employer’s WARN Act violation.72 At the core of the debate
over the method of calculating back pay for the period of the WARN
Act violation is the issue of whether the remedy provided by the WARN
Act is compensatory, make-whole, or punitive in nature. Unfortunately,
courts are not in agreement over this issue.73
A. The Majority View
The majority of the circuit courts that have considered the type of
remedies afforded by the WARN Act subscribe to the theory that the
WARN Act provides employees with a compensatory, make-whole
remedy.74 Recently, in Local Joint Executive Board of Culinary/
Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals declared that “the primary purpose of the [WARN] Act is
remedial” as opposed to punitive.75 There, the Las Vegas Sands hotel
and casino ordered a closure and provided employees with only fortyfive days’ notice, rather than the sixty days’ notice required under the

ambiguous language of the WARN Act will continue to cause interpretative problems
until either Congress amends the Act or the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari.
72. The WARN Act provides that any employer who conducts a mass layoff or
plant closing in violation of the Act shall be liable to aggrieved employees for “back pay
for each day of violation” and “benefits under an employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. §
2104(a)(1) (2002).
73. The Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits all agree that the WARN Act provides for
a compensatory, make-whole remedy for aggrieved employees. Under such a theory, the
workers are provided with the amount of pay and benefits that they would have earned
during the violation period. See Las Vegas Sands, 244 F.3d. at 1158–59; Saxion v.
Titan-C-Mfg., Inc., 86 F.3d 553, 560–61 (6th Cir. 1996); Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1283–86.
But see United Steelworkers, 5 F.3d at 42–43 (concluding that “back pay” is merely a
label and the calculation of damages is to be based on calendar days, as opposed to
working days, during the violation period, resulting in a punitive remedy).
74. See Las Vegas Sands, 244 F.3d at 1159 (“‘[B]ack pay’ under the WARN Act is
a make-whole compensatory remedy . . . .”); Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1284 & n.14; Shannon
v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 45 P.3d 345, 350 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (“The primary
purpose of the WARN Act is remedial.”).
75. Las Vegas Sands, 244 F.3d at 1159.
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WARN Act.76 The court found that, given the make-whole remedy
provided for by the WARN Act, the employees should be compensated
for the money that they would have earned “but for the premature
closure in violation of the WARN Act.”77 In an earlier case, Burns v.
Stone Forest Industries, Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had
likened the remedy provided to employees under the WARN Act to
business interruption insurance that protects employees’ income stream
in the event they are told on payday that the plant is closing that
afternoon.78 Building on its prior analysis in Burns, the Ninth Circuit in
Las Vegas Sands further explained that in enacting the WARN Act,
Congress had been concerned with insuring an employee’s income
stream,79 as evidenced by a Senate report that explicitly stated the
WARN Act’s purpose to “eas[e] the personal and financial difficulties
for workers who must make these transitions.”80
Support for the majority interpretation of the WARN Act is
intensifying. In United Mine Workers v. Midwest Coal Co., the Indiana
District Court found the Las Vegas Sands analysis persuasive and
concluded that the WARN Act provides for a make-whole remedy and is
remedial in nature.81 The Midwest Coal court recognized that the
primary purpose of the WARN Act is to provide advance notice of plant
closings and mass layoffs.82 However, the court further recognized that
the WARN Act clearly has another purpose: “to provide the effected
[sic] employees as close as possible with the pay they would have
otherwise earned but for the plant closing and WARN Act violation.”83

76. Id. at 1156.
77. Id. at 1159.
78. Burns v. Stone Forest Indus., 147 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998).
79. Las Vegas Sands, 244 F.3d at 1159.
80. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-62, at 3 (1987)). The Senate report analyzed the
Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act, from which the
provisions of the WARN Act were eventually severed and enacted as separate
legislation. Id.; S. REP. NO. 100-62 (1987).
81. United Mine Workers v. Midwest Coal Co., No. TH 99-C-141-T/H, 2001 WL
1385893, at *4–6 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 31, 2001). The court found Las Vegas Sands
persuasive for two reasons: (1) it is in accord with the majority of other courts in
concluding that damages provided by the WARN Act are intended to make the aggrieved
employee whole, and (2) legislative history of the WARN Act “supports the conclusion
that the Act is remedial.” Id. at *5–6.
82. Id. at *6.
83. Id.
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B. The Minority View
A small minority of courts cling to the theory that the WARN Act is a
punitive statute.84 In Joshlin v. Gannett River States Publishing Corp.,
the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas grounded its
conclusion that the WARN Act provides for a punitive remedy in the
fact that an employer may not offset its WARN Act violation liability
with wages received by the employee from other sources during the
violation period.85 The Joshlin court interpreted the disallowance of an
offset as evidence of congressional intent to maximize the punitive effect
of the damages allowable under the WARN Act.86
That the employee remedies under the WARN Act are not purely
remedial in nature does not jeopardize the basic remedial nature of the
employee’s remedy.
In Carpenters District Council v. Dillard
Department Stores, the Fifth Circuit found the remedy provided to
employees to be compensatory and make-whole in nature and suggested
that Congress may have intended to not make the remedy purely
remedial.87 For example, Congress, in choosing to not make the remedy
available to aggrieved employees purely remedial, avoided placing on
employees the burden of immediately seeking other employment in
order to mitigate damages.88 One purpose of the WARN Act is to
“provid[e] workers and their families some transition time to adjust to
the . . . loss of employment.”89 Requiring an employee to mitigate his
damages would frustrate this underlying purpose;90 therefore, a purely
remedial scheme would not serve the purpose of the WARN Act.
However, the fact that the remedy available to employees under the
WARN Act is not purely remedial does not prevent it from being

84. See United Steelworkers of America v. North Star Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39, 42–43
(3d Cir. 1993) (adopting a calculation of damages based on calendar days that occur
during the violation period). The North Star Steel approach has been construed as
affording a punitive remedy. See Joshlin v. Gannett River States Publ’g Corp., 840 F.
Supp. 660, 663 (E.D. Ark. 1993) (“This is a punitive statute, not a ‘make-whole’
statute.”).
85. Joshlin, 840 F. Supp. at 663. The court determined that the plain meaning of
the statute subjects the violating employer to payment for each day of violation and that
a day of violation “may be a work day, a non-work day, a holiday, a weekend day, or any
day.” Id. Thus, the damages are not compensatory, but punitive in nature. Id.
86. Id. (“Congress sought to maximize the punitive effect of the liability provision
[of the WARN Act] by prohibiting employees [sic] from offsetting the back pay remedy
with any pay that its former employees receive from a subsequent employer.”).
87. Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1284 n.14
(5th Cir. 1994).
88. Id.
89. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a) (2002).
90. See Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1284 n.14.
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“generally remedial.”91 Thus, as the Dillard court concluded, the basic
compensatory nature of the WARN Act’s remedy remains intact.92
In Local 1239, International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Allsteel,
Inc.,93 the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found
unpersuasive the employee’s argument that the WARN Act provides for
a punitive remedy, thus requiring an employer to provide “penalties” to
its aggrieved employees just as it requires “civil penalties” to the
government.94 While the WARN Act does provide a punitive remedy to
the government by imposing the (up to) $500 per day civil penalty for
violation, the fact that one remedy under the WARN Act is punitive in
nature does not logically lead to the conclusion that all remedies under
the WARN Act, including the employee’s remedy, are punitive in
nature. Indeed, the WARN Act’s textual description of the employer’s
liability to the government as a “civil penalty” and to employees as
“back pay” is instructive. Nowhere in the WARN Act is the term
“penalty” used to describe the remedy afforded to employees.95 Thus,
Congress, in denoting the remedy for the government as a “penalty” and
the remedy for the employee as “back pay,” has distinguished the two
remedies. Such differentiation supports the proposition that employer
damages to employees under the WARN Act are not penalties.96
The last bit of hope for the minority’s interpretation of the WARN Act
remedies as punitive lies in the fact that the Act’s legislative history at
times refers to the statutory damages afforded by the WARN Act as a
penalty.97 Because the WARN Act requires an employer to provide
back pay and benefits to an aggrieved employee who is no longer
providing services, the Act, in a sense, penalizes the employer.98
However, simply because the damages provided to the employee may be
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. 9 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
94. Id. at 903–05.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Shannon v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 45 P.3d 345, 350–51 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2002) (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-62, at 24 (1987)). Although Senate Report 100-62
provided that the employees’ remedy under the WARN Act “is in effect a liquidated
damages provisions [sic], designed to penalize the wrongdoing employer, deter future
violations, and facilitate simplified damages proceedings,” S. REP. NO. 100-62, at 24
(1987), the Shannon court concluded that it did not “believe Congress intended the
WARN Act to be used to punish an employer.” Shannon, 45 P.3d at 351.
98. Breedlove v. Earthgrains Baking Cos., 140 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 1998).
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viewed as punitive on one level does not change the fact that the
damages are aimed at making the employee whole for the employer’s
violation. The payments to the employee can be characterized as “both
‘damages’ to the employer and ‘back pay’ to the employee.”99 Such
dual characterization does not change the overriding purpose of the
remedy: to make the employee whole.100
C. Amendment to Proclaim the Remedy as Compensatory
and Make-Whole
To effectively resolve the disagreement among the courts, the WARN
Act should be amended to clarify that the remedy afforded to aggrieved
employees is a compensatory, make-whole remedy.101 This amendment
will assist employers, like DeShai, in assessing their liability and in
ensuring that damages paid to employees in the event of a violation are
sufficient to extinguish the employer’s liability.102 A legislative
resolution to the split in the circuit courts is preferable to a judicial
resolution because Congress is able to address all of the ambiguities
surrounding the damages provisions of the WARN Act, whereas the
U.S. Supreme Court would be confined to resolving the issue in the case
before it. Thus, a statutory amendment would be the most effective
approach to setting out a clear rule with respect to WARN Act damages.
In light of, and in conjunction with the statutory amendment, the WARN
Act regulations should be amended to provide guidance with regard to
the calculation of damages.
V. CALCULATION OF DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION
OF THE WARN ACT
An employer who violates the WARN Act is liable to the aggrieved
99. Fegatelli v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 765 N.E.2d 961, 964 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2001).
100. See Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas
Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 973 (2001).
101. Suggested language for the amendment may include an addition to 29 U.S.C. §
2104(a)(1) that provides: “The remedy afforded to aggrieved employees for an
employer’s violation of the WARN Act is a compensatory, make-whole remedy.” A
similar amendment to the WARN Act regulations should also be made.
102. Specifically, declaring the employee’s remedy as a compensatory, make-whole
remedy will assist in the resolution of the debate over whether the calculation of back
pay should be based on the number of calendar or working days that occur during the
violation period. As discussed, infra Part IV, accepting the majority view that the
employee’s remedy is compensatory and make-whole leads to the logical conclusion that
the calculation of back pay must be based on the number of working days that occur
during the sixty day notice period and must include any payment for wages and benefits
that the employee would have received had he continued to work during that period.
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employees for “back pay for each day of violation.”103 The problem
with this statutory provision is two-fold: (1) the WARN Act and its
regulations do not define “back pay,”104 and (2) the WARN Act and its
regulations do not specify whether the calculation of back pay is to be
based on the number of calendar or working days that fall within the
violation period. Unfortunately, circuit courts have been unable to agree
on an interpretation of the WARN Act remedy provisions105 and the U.S.
Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to grant certiorari to resolve the
interpretive issues.106 Without clear guidance on these two points,
employers like DeShai that wish to adopt the pay-in-lieu-of-notice
approach cannot be assured of full WARN Act compliance.107
As a solution, Congress should amend the WARN Act to include a
definition of “back pay” as well as a designation that the calculation of
damages is to be based on the number of working days during the
violation period. Such amendments would both make the WARN Act
easier for employers like DeShai to apply and quiet much of the
litigation surrounding these hotly debated issues.
A. The “Back Pay” Ambiguity
Under the theory that the WARN Act provides a compensatory, makewhole remedy for aggrieved employees, the WARN Act should be
amended to define back pay as compensation for any pay and nonERISA benefits that would have been earned by employees if the
103. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1)(A). The rate of pay at which back pay shall be
calculated shall be the higher of (1) an average of the employee’s regular rate over the
previous three years of employment or (2) the employee’s final rate of pay. Id.
104. See United Mine Workers v. Midwest Coal Co., No. TH 99-C-141-T/H, 2001
WL 1385893, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 31, 2001) (“What forms of compensation constitute
‘back pay’ is left unanswered by the text of the statute.”).
105. Turner, supra note 70, at 199.
106. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 71.
107. An employer electing to use the pay-in-lieu-of-notice approach is no doubt
taking a risk that the amount paid to employees may not fully cover its WARN Act
liability, depending on the current state of the law in the circuit in which the employee is
employed. It is important to note that when an employee is employed in a state covered
by a circuit court that has not yet decided the issue of which method should be used to
calculated back pay, the employer is left with little guidance on how to calculate such
payment to the employees. The employer is, in a sense, taking a leap of faith that the
amount paid to the employees is sufficient to extinguish liability. However, there is
always a possibility of a lawsuit by terminated employees that could cost the employer
large sums of money, especially if the terminated employees were to initiate a class
action lawsuit.
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employees had been given the required notice and if they had continued
working during the notice period. Under such a definition, the employer
would take a snapshot view of the amount that the employee would have
earned during the violation period; that amount would constitute the
amount of back pay owed as damages. Adopting this “snapshot”
approach would greatly assist employers like DeShai in determining
their WARN Act liability because it gives employers a concise test to
apply when the question arises as to whether a certain form of
compensation should be included in the back pay calculation. The
employer would simply ask one question: “Would the employee have
earned this compensation but for the failure to provide proper WARN
Act notice?” If the answer is in the affirmative, the compensation would
be included in the back pay calculation.
1. What Constitutes “Back Pay”?
For years the circuit courts have struggled with the question of just
what should be included in back pay for purposes of determining an
employer’s WARN Act liability. In interpreting what is meant by back
pay for purposes of the WARN Act, courts have turned to the definition
of back pay used in other federal statutes.108 As used in various federal
statutes, including the WARN Act, back pay has been interpreted in the
normal sense to include the following: payment for work performed on
holidays,109 tips,110 overtime,111 fringe benefits such as vacation and sick
pay,112 and shift differentials.113 In addition, courts interpreting the
108. See, e.g., Joint Local Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las
Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing, among others, Pettway v.
Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 263 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding that back pay under
Title VII includes salary as well as “[i]nterest, overtime, shift differentials, and fringe
benefits such as vacation and sick pay”)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 973 (2001); see also
infra notes 110–113.
109. Las Vegas Sands, 244 F.3d at 1156 (finding that “employees who can prove
that they would have worked on a holiday are entitled to back pay at the rate they would
have been paid for that holiday”).
110. Id. (finding that back pay includes tip income).
111. See Kossman v. Calumet County, 849 F.2d 1027, 1032–33 (7th Cir. 1988)
(including overtime pay in back pay calculation under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act). In the WARN Act arena, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia recently concluded that the inclusion of overtime in the back pay
calculation for a WARN Act violation is appropriate. United Mine Workers v. Martinka
Coal Co., 45 F. Supp. 2d 521, 527 (N.D.W. Va. 1999), aff’d, 202 F.3d 717 (4th Cir. 2000).
112. See Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1549, 1562 (11th Cir.
1986) (finding that vacation and sick pay are included in back pay under Title VII);
Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939, 940, 947–48 (6th Cir. 1975) (finding that
fringe benefits including vacation and sick pay are included in back pay under Title VII);
Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 263 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding that
vacation and sick pay are ingredients of back pay in a Title VII suit).
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WARN Act have recently moved toward the adoption of a broad view of
back pay, according to which back pay includes non-ERISA fringe
benefits such as vacation, graduated vacation, floating vacation, and
personal days on the basis that they are “contractual days.”114 Given the
compensatory, make-whole remedy provided by the WARN Act, this
broad view of back pay is most consistent with the intended purpose of
the WARN Act.
However, William Cowen recently wrote an article advocating that the
WARN Act does not allow for the recovery of non-ERISA benefits.115
To support his argument that the definition of back pay has become too
broad and that a narrow reading to exclude non-ERISA fringe benefits is
the only reasonable interpretation,116 Cowen relies on three district court
cases: Ciarlante v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,117 Carpenters
District Council v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc.,118 and Jones v.
Kayser-Roth Hosiery, Inc.119 However, these cases do not represent the
113. Nichols v. Frank, 771 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (D. Or. 1991) (finding that night
and weekend shift differentials are included in back pay calculations under Title VII),
aff’d, 42 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994).
114. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Midwest Coal Co., No. TH 99-C-141-T/H,
2001 WL 1385893, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 31, 2001) (finding that aggrieved employees
are entitled to be paid for non-ERISA contractual days under the WARN Act); Martinka
Coal Co., 45 F. Supp. 2d at 530 (finding that aggrieved employees are entitled to recover
non-ERISA fringe benefits that would have accrued during the violation period).
115. William B. Cowen et al., An Argument that the WARN Act Does Not Allow
Plaintiffs to Recover Non-ERISA Benefits, 16 LAB. LAW. 269 (2000). Cowen, a member
of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), served as an attorney for the NLRB
from 1979 to 1985 and was in private practice until his appointment as an NLRB
member in January 2002. United States National Labor Relations Board, William B.
Cowen, at http://www.nlrb.gov/cowen.html (last updated Mar. 13, 2002). The NLRB was
created by Congress to administer the National Labor Relations Act, a statute that
“guarantees the right of employees to organize and to bargain collectively with their
employers or to refrain from all such activity.” United States National Labor Relations
Board, Fact Sheet on the National Labor Relations Board, at http://www.nlrb.gov/
facts.html (last updated Dec. 4, 2002). The NLRB has two major functions: (1) to
determine whether employees desire union representation and (2) to prevent and remedy
unfair labor practices of employers and unions. Id. In essence, the NLRB serves to
protect employees. Thus, it is somewhat puzzling that Cowen is advocating a narrow
interpretation of the WARN Act damages provisions that would exclude non-ERISA
benefits, thereby affording laid-off employees less protection.
116. Cowen et. al., supra note 115, at 273, 278–80.
117. No. 95-4646, 1996 WL 741973 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 1996), rev’d, 143 F.3d 139
(3d Cir. 1998).
118. 778 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. La. 1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 15 F.3d 1275
(5th Cir. 1994).
119. 748 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Tenn. 1990), amended by 753 F. Supp. 218 (E.D.
Tenn. 1990).
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current majority view and reliance on them is misplaced.
In Ciarlante, the court determined that the inclusion of fringe benefits
in back pay under the WARN Act was limited to ERISA benefits
only.120 The Ciarlante court, a district court within the Third Circuit,
did not subscribe to the majority view that the WARN Act provides for a
compensatory, make-whole remedy. Instead, the court premised its
interpretation of the remedy provision on the minority view, as
expressed by the Third Circuit in United Steelworkers of America v.
North Star Steel Co.,121 that the WARN Act remedy is not compensatory
in nature. The Ciarlante court accepted the Third Circuit’s interpretation as
binding but admitted that the interpretation “has not been universally
accepted.”122 This begs the question whether Ciarlante would have been
decided differently had the district court not been bound by North Star Steel.
The district court in Dillard disallowed a credit against an employer’s
WARN Act liability for accrued vacation paid to employees, a nonERISA benefit.123 In dicta, the court implied that a credit may have been
allowed had state law not imposed on the employer a legal obligation to
pay accrued vacation.124 In his article, Cowen claims that this dicta “can
be logically extended to imply that any [non-ERISA] benefit paid to
employees . . . [is] not a benefit recoverable under the WARN Act.”125
The primary weakness of Cowen’s “logically extended” implication is its
basis in district court dicta. Further, this Dillard opinion was issued in
1991. Since that time, many other courts have weighed in on the issue and
have allowed recovery of non-ERISA benefits under the WARN Act.126
Similarly, in 1990 the district court in Jones127 found that employers
were not required to pay employees for vacation benefits that would
have accrued had the employees worked during the sixty day violation
period.128 Because this decision was handed down well before the
current trend toward inclusion of non-ERISA benefits in WARN Act
damages, its value as support for Cowen’s argument is questionable.
In addition to his reliance on the above district court cases, Cowen
also points to the WARN Act’s express terms, which provide that
aggrieved employees are entitled to benefits that they would have
received under an ERISA benefits plan. These benefits include the cost
120. Ciarlante, 1996 WL 741973, at *3.
121. 5 F.3d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1993).
122. Ciarlante, 1996 WL 741973, at *2.
123. Dillard, 778 F. Supp. at 311.
124. Id.
125. Cowen et. al., supra note 115, at 279–80.
126. See infra notes 134–137 and accompanying text.
127. 748 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Tenn. 1990), amended by 753 F. Supp. 218 (E.D.
Tenn. 1990).
128. Id. at 1301.
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of any medical expenses incurred during the violation period that would
have been covered by the benefit plan had the employer not violated the
WARN Act.129 Cowen argues that if back pay were interpreted to
include non-ERISA fringe benefits, section 2104(a)(1)(B) of the WARN
Act, which entitles aggrieved employees to ERISA benefits, would be
devoid of meaning and thus superfluous.130 Therefore, he concludes,
“‘[b]ack pay,’ as used in the WARN Act, must describe something less
than all pay and all benefits.”131
This narrow interpretation of back pay is inconsistent with both the
purpose of the WARN Act and the compensatory, make-whole remedy
provided for by the Act. As previously established, the majority view is
that the WARN act provides for a compensatory, make-whole remedy
that includes the pay and benefits that the employee would have received
during the violation period.132 If an employer provides the sixty days’
notice as required by the WARN Act, employees who accrue nonERISA benefits, such as holiday and vacation pay, will continue to
accrue them during the sixty days. An employer who violates the
WARN Act notice requirement, thereby preventing employees from
working during the sixty day notice period,133 should not then be
excused from compensating employees for the holiday and vacation pay
that would have accrued had the employer not violated the Act. If
employees are not entitled to recover for the holiday and vacation pay
that they would have accrued during the violation period, they are
certainly not made whole by the employer’s payment of damages.
Moreover, the violating employer will benefit from its own violation.
Such a result is inequitable and frustrates the purpose of the WARN Act.
The trend of recent WARN Act case law is toward an interpretation
that includes non-ERISA benefits in the definition of back pay. In 2001,
the Ninth Circuit proclaimed in Las Vegas Sands that tip income and pay
for work on holidays are deemed to be included in the definition of back
129. See Cowen et al., supra note 115, at 273; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1)(B) (2000).
130. Cowen et al., supra note 115, at 273. The rule of statutory interpretation
provides that a reading of the statute that would make another provision of the same
statute superfluous should be avoided. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S.
30, 36 (1992).
131. Cowen et. al., supra note 115, at 273.
132. See supra Part III.A.
133. See Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas
Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he employer’s obligation to pay
was triggered[] by the fact that [the employer] prevented the employees’ performance by
closing their workplace.”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 973 (2001).
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pay.134 The Ninth Circuit based its interpretation of back pay on the
premise that employees should be compensated for the money that they
would have earned during the notice period had the employer given
proper notice.135 Also in 2001, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana, in United Mine Workers v. Midwest Coal Co.,136
found the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Las Vegas Sands to be
persuasive and adopted a broad view of back pay that included nonERISA benefits.137 This trend in decisions is due to wide acceptance of
the underlying principle that the WARN Act provides employees a
compensatory, make-whole remedy. To make employees whole, all
benefits that would have been earned during the violation period,
including non-ERISA benefits, should be included in the damages
payment.
2. A Resolution to the “Back Pay” Ambiguity
The WARN Act should be amended to define back pay as any pay and
non-ERISA benefits that the employee would have earned had he been
allowed to continue working during the violation period. Under this
definition, employers would take a snapshot of that amount that the
employee would have earned during this period and would then pay the
employee the full amount of these earnings. The proposed amendment
and snapshot test are consistent with the normal meaning of back pay
and serve the overall purpose of the WARN Act138 by putting the
employee in the same position he would have been in had his
employment not been prematurely terminated in violation of the WARN
Act. In addition, including a definition of back pay in the WARN Act
will serve to put to rest much of the litigation surrounding the current
remedy ambiguity of the Act.139 Further, the adoption of the snapshot
test provides employers with clear guidance in calculating back pay.
The back pay definition and snapshot test in turn assist employers like
134. Id. at 1156.
135. Id. at 1159. The court adopts “the normal meaning of back pay” and finds this
meaning “consistent with the overall purpose of the WARN Act.” Id. at 1158.
136. No. TH 99-C-141-T/H, 2001 WL 1385893 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 31, 2001).
137. Id. at *7 (holding that, under the WARN Act, plaintiffs are entitled to be paid for
non-ERISA contractual paid days off, including “vacation, graduated vacation, floating
vacation and personal days”); see also United Mine Workers v. Martinka Coal. Co., 45
F. Supp. 2d 521, 530 (N.D.W. Va. 1999) (“[T]he concept of back pay includes not only
wages, but also all the fringe benefits the employee would have earned had the violation
not occurred.”).
138. Las Vegas Sands, 244 F.3d at 1158.
139. Reducing litigation will ease the cost of litigation burden not only on
employers, but also on the taxpayers whose tax dollars fund the judicial system tasked
with resolving these disputes.
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DeShai in heading off potential litigation by giving them the necessary
tools and guidance to calculate WARN Act liability with certainty,
thereby removing the risk from the pay-in-lieu-of-notice approach.140
Lastly, a back pay definition will prove especially helpful for multistate
employers whose employees are dispersed over a large area and are thus
governed by circuit courts that may subscribe to different interpretations
of the WARN Act remedy provisions.141
B. Calendar Days Versus Working Days
Once an employer knows what constitutes back pay, the question
arises as to whether the back pay must be provided for the number of
calendar days or working days during the period of the employer’s
violation. The WARN Act should be amended to make clear that an
employee’s WARN Act damages must be provided for the total number
of working days that fall within the violation period. Not only would
such an amendment be consistent with the snapshot test discussed above,
it would also put to rest the current split between the circuit courts on the
issue. Because the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to settle the issue
of whether the calculation of damages is based on the number of
calendar or working days,142 employers have been forced to deal with
the unresolved split between the circuits for nearly a decade.143 An
amendment to the WARN Act is long overdue.
An amendment establishing that the calculation of WARN Act
damages is based on the number of working days rather than calendar
days is supported by the majority of the circuit courts that have

140. Included in the risks an employer analyzes when faced with a RIF is the
likelihood of a lawsuit resulting from the RIF. Unless the employer is willing to provide
consideration in addition to the statutory remedy, the employer will not be able to obtain
a release of claims from employees. Thus, when the employer makes the decision to pay
damages in lieu of notice, it obviously would like to ensure, to the greatest extent
possible, that the amount paid will extinguish any liability it may have for violating the
WARN Act.
141. Employers in this situation are uncertain as to which circuit to follow if the
circuit in which the employees are located has not decided the issue. This situation also
raises the issue of how to treat employees working in states in which the courts have
employed diverging interpretations of the WARN Act remedy provisions.
142. See cases cited supra note 71.
143. See Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1283–86
(5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); United Steelworkers of America v. North
Star Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39, 42–43 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1114 (1994).
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addressed the issue.144 Basing damages on working days compensates
employees for the income and benefits they would have received had the
employer not prematurely terminated their employment in violation of
the WARN Act.145 This approach fulfills the purpose of the WARN Act
by making the employees whole.146 Moreover, legislative history
supports this interpretation. The Senate Labor Committee stated in 1987
that damages for a violation of the WARN Act “are to be measured by
the wages . . . the employee would have received had the plant remained
open or the layoff been deferred until the conclusion of the notice
period.”147 Therefore, because damages are measured by “the wages the
employee would have received,” the working days method is the
appropriate basis for calculating damages.148
1. The Third Circuit’s “Unique” View
Of the circuits that have ruled on the calendar versus working days
debate, only one circuit continues to cling to the calendar day calculation
approach. The Third Circuit, in United Steelworkers of America v.
North Star Steel Co.,149 found that the language of the WARN Act
unambiguously points to a plain meaning interpretation that an employer
who violates the WARN Act is liable for back pay for each calendar day
of the violation period.150 In North Star Steel, the defendant did not
contest its liability for failure to give the required notice. Rather, the
disputed issue was whether the calculation of damages for back pay and
benefits should be based on the number of calendar or working days
during the violation period.151 The Third Circuit rejected the argument
144. See Local 1239, Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Allsteel, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 901,
903 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“[T]he majority rule is that the employer is liable only for work
days within the period of the violation.”) and cases cited therein.
145. See Saxion v. Titan-C-Mfg., Inc., 86 F.3d 553, 560–61 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing
Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 15 F.3d 1275, 1283–86 (5th Cir.
1994)); Local 1239, Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
146. See Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas
Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that back pay under the
WARN Act is a make-whole remedy allowing damages to compensate the employee for
the lack of notice by the employer), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 973 (2001).
147. S. REP. NO. 100-62, at 24 (1987); see also Breedlove v. Earthgrains Baking
Cos., 140 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-62, at 24 (1987));
Saxion, 86 F.3d at 559 (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-62, at 24 (1987)).
148. See Breedlove, 140 F.3d at 801 (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-62, at 24 (1987)).
149. 5 F.3d 39 (3d Cir. 1993).
150. Id. at 42.
151. Id. at 41. At the time the Third Circuit was presented with this issue, no other
circuit court had issued an opinion on the issue. See id. However, by the time the Third
Circuit issued its ruling, the Fifth Circuit had pending before it the very same issue in
Carpenters District Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., see id., but the matter was not
decided by the Fifth Circuit until five months after North Star Steel was decided. See
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that back pay was intended to mean lost earnings during the violation
period and instead interpreted back pay as merely “a label used to
describe the amount of damages for which an employer is liable for each
day of the violation,”152 which should then be multiplied by the number
of calendar days of violation.153
The Third Circuit’s rationale for this interpretation was threefold.
First, the court applied the statutory interpretation maxim that an
interpretation that renders other provisions of a statute superfluous
should be avoided.154 The Third Circuit reasoned that if back pay meant
lost earnings, subsection 2104(a)(2) of the WARN Act, which allows
employer offsets for wages already paid,155 would be superfluous
because a “lost earnings calculation would automatically exclude the
reductions” for wages paid.156
The Third Circuit’s interpretation of back pay commits the same sin of
statutory interpretation that the court sought to avoid. Subsection
2104(a)(1)(A) clearly sets forth the rate of compensation upon which to
base WARN Act damages.157 Thus, the Third Circuit’s position that
“each day of the violation” is intended to refer to calendar days and that
back pay refers to the individual’s pay rate, which is to be multiplied by
the number of calendar days, violates fundamental statutory interpretation
rules by rendering subsections 2104(a)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) superfluous.158
This is because if back pay is merely a label for the rate of compensation
of WARN Act damages, as suggested by the Third Circuit, there would
be no need for yet another definition of the rate of damages in
subsections 2104(a)(1)(A)(i) and (ii).

Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1275 (5th Cir.
1995). The Fifth Circuit, in issuing its decision in Dillard, kicked off the circuit split
when it held that the calculation of damages was to be based on the number of working
days that fall within the violation period. See id. at 1283–86.
152. North Star Steel, 5 F.3d at 42.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. Subsection 2104(a)(2) allows an employer to offset its WARN Act
damages by “any wages paid by the employer to the employee for the period of the
violation.” 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(2) (2000).
156. North Star Steel, 5 F.3d at 42.
157. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1)(A). This section provides that back pay shall be
awarded “at a rate of compensation not less than the higher of (i) the average regular rate
received by such employee during the last 3 years of the employee’s employment; or (ii)
the final regular rate received by such employee.” Id.
158. Turner, supra note 70, at 221.
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Second, the Third Circuit reasoned that interpreting back pay to mean
lost earnings would lead to “absurd or unreasonable results.”159
According to the Third Circuit’s reasoning, if subsection 2104(a)(2)
were not superfluous, an employer would receive double credit for the
wage payments to the employee.160 An employer would be able to
subtract the wage payments the first time in conjunction with the
calculation of back pay under subsection 2104(a)(1) and then a second
time pursuant to subsection 2104(a)(2). Because such a result would be
unreasonable, the Third Circuit argued, the working days approach
should not be adopted.161
While giving an employer double credit for the wages paid to an
employee would be unreasonable, the terms of subsection 2104(a)(2)
prevent such double counting.162 The Fifth Circuit, in Carpenters
District Council v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., pointed out the flaw
in the Third Circuit’s reading of subsection 2104(a)(2).163 Subsection
2104(a)(2) allows an employer to deduct from its WARN Act liability
the wages earned for work performed during the violation period.164
This provision generally applies to circumstances in which the employer
has substantially reduced an employee’s hours without giving the
employee the required sixty days’ notice165 but has not yet terminated
the employee.166 Because a terminated employee, by definition, will not
perform services during the violation period, such an employee will not
receive any wages during the violation period. Therefore, subsection
2104(a)(2) will not apply because there will be no “wages paid” for the
employer to deduct.167 Unless an employer pays statutory damages to a
159. North Star Steel, 5 F.3d at 42 (quoting Robert T. Winzinger, Inc. v. Mgmt.
Recruiters, Inc., 841 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir. 1988)).
160. Id. at 42–43.
161. Id. at 43.
162. See Saxion v. Titan-C-Mfg., Inc., 86 F.3d 553, 559–60 (6th Cir. 1996).
163. Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1284 n.14
(5th Cir. 1994).
164. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(2) (2000). This section provides in part: “The amount for
which an employer is liable . . . shall be reduced by any wages paid by the employer to the
employee for the period of the violation . . . .” Id.; see also Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1284 n.14.
165. See 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(6)(C).
166. Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1284 n.14. Subsection 2104(a)(2) would also apply when
an employer places an employee on a paid leave of absence during the violation period
or when an employer pays statutory damages in lieu of notice. See supra Part III.B.
167. Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1284 n.14. In fact, as argued by the defendant in North
Star Steel Co., the Third Circuit’s own interpretation may produce anomalous results.
See Saxion, 86 F.3d at 560.
If each aggrieved employee were entitled to damages in the amount of a normal
day’s pay multiplied by 60, a hypothetical part-time employee who worked just
one ten-hour shift each Saturday would recover substantially higher damages
than a full-time employee, paid at the same hourly rate, who worked eight hours
per day, five days per week. Such a result would obviously be absurd.
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terminated employee during the violation period under the pay-in-lieuof-notice approach, the employer will not be allowed a deduction under
subsection 2104(a)(2) for a terminated employee.168
Lastly, the Third Circuit determined that interpreting back pay to
mean lost earnings would render subsection 2104(a)(1) inconsistent with
other provisions of the WARN Act.169 The Third Circuit reasoned that if
back pay is interpreted to mean lost earnings, an employer should be
allowed to offset its WARN Act obligations with any earnings received
by an employee during the violation period, including wages received from
a different employer.170 Therefore, because subsection 2104(a)(2)(A)
only allows a deduction for wages paid by the violating employer,
subsection 2104(a)(2) is inconsistent with a lost earnings interpretation
of back pay under subsection 2104(a)(1).171
Both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have found such reasoning to be
unpersuasive.172 While it is true that the WARN Act does not include a
provision that would allow an employer to deduct the wages that its
employee earns from other employers, the Fifth Circuit persuasively
provides plausible reasons for the WARN Act’s departure from a purely
remedial damage award: “the desire to avoid placing a burden on a
terminated employee to mitigate damages by taking any job offered, the
desire to give a terminated employee a window of time to readjust
without immediately having to search for a job, [and] the desire for
simplicity in the statutory scheme.”173
Although the Third Circuit’s adoption of a calendar day interpretation
has found little following,174 it nonetheless remains the current law of

Id.

168. Lipsig & Fentonmiller, supra note 48, at 311. It should be noted that while the
pay-in-lieu-of-notice approach may be a technical violation of the WARN Act, if proper
pay is provided, no damages will be owed to the employee because the employee’s
exclusive remedy would be satisfied by the pay-in-lieu-of-notice payment. Id.; see also
supra Part III.B.
169. United Steelworkers of America v. North Star Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39, 43 (3d Cir.
1993).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Saxion, 86 F.3d at 558–61; Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1284 n.14.
173. Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1284 n.14.
174. See Johnson v. Telespectrum Worldwide, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 116, 127 (D.
Del. 1999) (noting that every other circuit to decide the calendar versus working day
issue has held working days to be the proper measure of damages); infra note 179 and
accompanying text.
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the Third Circuit.175 Thus, an employer that has employees in multiple
states will likely find itself stymied by these differing interpretations
with no way to comply with all applicable laws. Take, for example, the
employer that has employees in Pennsylvania (within the Third Circuit,
which has adopted the calendar days approach), Ohio (within the Sixth
Circuit, which has adopted the working days approach), and Indiana
(within the Seventh Circuit, which has yet to rule on the issue of whether
the calendar or working days approach should be adopted). If this
employer violates the WARN Act by failing to provide proper notice
and seeks to satisfy its liability through the pay-in-lieu-of-notice
approach, it will be required to calculate the employees’ pay using a
separate formula for each state. The employer will likely use the
working days method to determine liability to the Indian employees
because there is no guidance on this point from the Seventh Circuit and
the working days approach is more favorable to the employer. Under
the separate calculations approach, the Pennsylvania employees will
receive a windfall due to the calendar day calculation, while the Ohio
and Indiana employees will not receive this windfall under the working
days calculation. Although utilizing the separate calculations approach
affords the employer a good chance of avoiding WARN Act liability, the
employer subjects itself to potential liability for discrimination claims
from the Ohio and Indiana employees. Thus, this hypothetical employer
faces a Hobson’s choice between liability for its WARN Act violation
and liability for employee discrimination.176 Problems like this are very
real. To avoid imposing such undue economic hardship on employers, a
change to the WARN Act is necessary.
2. A Resolution to the Calendar Days Versus Working Days
Debate: The Working Days Approach
Should Be Adopted
The WARN Act should be amended to reflect that the calculation of
back pay is based on the number of working days during the violation
period. As previously discussed, a statutory amendment is the most
effective means for resolving the debate because the issue can be wholly

175. See Johnson, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 127. The Third Circuit is comprised of
Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000).
176. Of course, the employer could take the ultraconservative approach of
providing the Ohio and Indiana employees with the same windfall provided to the
Pennsylvania employees by paying Ohio and Indiana employees based on the calendar
day approach. However, such an approach would impose an additional financial burden
on the employer that could be quite substantial, depending on the amount of additional
back pay required by the calendar day approach.
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addressed in the amendment.177 Such an amendment is supported by a
majority of the circuit courts, legislative history, and long-standing
principles of statutory interpretation. As discussed above, in the event of
an employer violation, the WARN Act provides for a “make-whole”
remedy for employees, whereby the employer must pay damages equal
to the money and benefits the employees would have earned had proper
notice been given.178 To date, six circuits have addressed the issue of
whether the calculation of back pay is based on the number of calendar
or on the number of working days. All of these circuits, with the
exception of the Third Circuit, have concluded that the calculation is
based on the number of working days.179 In addition, although the
Seventh Circuit has not yet ruled on the matter, a district court within the
Seventh Circuit has adopted the working day calculation approach.180
Compensating employees only for the number of working days during
the violation period makes the most sense and is consistent with the
purpose of the WARN Act.181 If the measure of damages were based on
the number of calendar days, employees would receive back pay for
days that they would not have worked had they been given the proper
notice. Thus, aggrieved employees would receive a windfall, which
would put them in a better position than they would have enjoyed absent
the WARN Act violation.182 If the goal of the WARN Act is to make
employees whole, a working days approach achieves this end.183 In
contrast, a calendar day interpretation goes beyond the intent of the Act
and results in an employee windfall at the expense of the employer.184
177. See discussion supra Part IV.C (regarding the advantages of a statutory
resolution over a judicial resolution).
178. See Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas
Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 973 (2001).
179. See Joe v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1067, 1072 (8th Cir. 2000); Burns v.
Stone Forest Indus., Inc., 147 F.3d 1182, 1182–85 (9th Cir. 1998); Saxion v. Titan-CMfg., Inc., 86 F.3d 553, 558–61 (6th Cir. 1996); Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 61 F.3d 757,
771–72 (10th Cir. 1995); Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d
1275, 1282–86 (5th Cir. 1994); United Steelworkers v. North Star Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39,
41–44 (3d Cir. 1993).
180. Local 1239, Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Allsteel, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 901,
903, 906 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
181. See United Mine Workers v. Midwest Coal Co., No. TH 99-C-141-T/H, 2001
WL 1385893, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 31, 2001).
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. The windfall at the employer’s expense has a punitive effect. Requiring
employers to pay a windfall to employees upon violation of WARN Act would have
detrimental corporate economic effects in that it would further damage a company’s
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In addition, such a result would be directly contrary to congressional
intent. The Senate has stated that the WARN Act was not intended as a
means “to place an additional financial burden on the employers of this
country.”185 Thus, because the calendar day interpretation would impose
additional financial burdens on employers by requiring them to pay
employees for days the employees would not have otherwise worked,
such an interpretation is inconsistent with the purpose of the WARN Act
and should be rejected.186 Although the working day approach would
theoretically allow employees a windfall if they were immediately able
to secure reemployment with another employer, such a windfall is
acceptable because the violating employer does not bear its expense and
it does not frustrate the purpose of the WARN Act.187
In addition, the calendar day interpretation is inconsistent with the
concept of back pay and congressional intent to maintain the employee’s
income stream during the violation period. As proposed by this
Comment, back pay consists of any payments the employee would have
received during the violation period had the employee continued to
work. The calendar day approach flies in the face of the concept of back
pay in that it compensates employees for days that they did not work.188
It allows damages to employees beyond that which they could have
reasonably expected to have earned during the violation period.189
Further, calculating back pay based on the number of calendar days
rather than on the number of working days arbitrarily causes some
employees to receive greater damage payments than others.190 For
example, an employee who works four ten-hour shifts per week would
receive more back pay than an employee who works five eight-hour
shifts per week.191 Because both workers normally work forty hours per
bottom line, which is clearly already suffering as evidenced by the need to conduct the
mass layoff or plant closing. Pushing a company unnecessarily closer to failure only
serves to further perpetuate the ripple effect felt by companies and citizens in poor
economic times.
185. Breedlove v. Earthgrains Baking Cos., 140 F.3d 797, 801 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998)
(quoting 134 CONG. REC. 15,928 (1988) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum)).
186. The additional cost to an employer in paying damages that are based on the
number of calendar days instead of working days is startling. Jeffrey J. Turner proposes
that the additional cost of the calendar day approach is roughly thirty percent. To take
the theory out of the abstract and into the present, Turner took the facts of the North Star
Steel case and applied a hypothetical calculation associated with laying off 270
employees without proper WARN Act notice. Under the calendar day approach, the
employer’s liability was $1,373,760, whereas under the workday approach, the
employer’s liability was $1,007,424—a $360,000 difference. Turner, supra note 70, at 200.
187. See Turner, supra note 70, at 221.
188. See Breedlove, 140 F.3d at 800.
189. See Turner, supra note 70, at 218.
190. Burns v. Stone Forest Indus., Inc., 147 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998).
191. Id. In this example, the employee who worked eight hours a day would
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week and the only difference between the two workers is the number of
hours per day that they work, allowing one worker to receive more back
pay than the other is “arbitrary and serves no useful purpose.”192
Therefore, the only reasonable interpretation of the back pay provision of
the WARN Act is that the calculation of back pay is to be based on the
number of working days that fall within the violation period.
Obviously both DeShai and its employees have an economic stake in
the manner in which the calendar versus working days debate is settled:
they both stand to either gain or lose money.193 DeShai wishes to
minimize damages owed, while the employees wish to maximize such
damages. However, the working days approach best serves the purpose
of the WARN Act by preventing windfall payments to the employees at
the employer’s expense and by avoiding any unintended punitive effect
on the employer. Amending the WARN Act to clarify that the
calculation of back pay is to be based on the number of working days
would further the purpose of the Act and would put employees in the
same position they would have been absent the employer’s violation.194
VI. CONCLUSION
The intent behind the WARN Act is a noble one: to protect the income
stream of American workers in the event of mass layoffs and plant
closures by requiring advance notice to affected employees. However,
unless employers, such as DeShai, are able to understand their
obligations and potential liability under the WARN Act, workers will
not fully realize the protections that the WARN Act seeks to provide. It
is imperative that an employer attempting to comply with the WARN
Act be able to determine with relative certainty the actions that it must
take to relieve itself of liability under the Act. Certainty with respect to
damages is vital because it gives employers incentives to preempt
damages awards by immediately paying aggrieved employees WARN
Act damages in order to avoid the assessment of government penalties.
receive 480 hours worth of back pay for a sixty day violation period, whereas the
employee who worked ten hours a day would receive 600 hours worth of back pay for a
sixty day violation period. This difference is true despite the fact that both employees
work the same forty hours per week. Id.; Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep’t
Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1285 n.16 (5th Cir. 1994).
192. United Mine Workers v. Midwest Coal Co., No. TH 99-C-141-T/H, 2001 WL
1385893, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 31, 2001).
193. See Turner, supra note 70, at 200.
194. See id. at 218.
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Unfortunately, the WARN Act’s ambiguity and the splits between the
circuit courts in interpreting such ambiguities have created a situation in
which no employer can be assured that its compliance actions are
sufficient to relieve it of liability. Without the certainty that the
preemptive payment of damages will relieve an employer of its liability
for a WARN Act violation, voluntary payment of damages by employers
will not be the norm and employees will be forced to fight for their
entitlements under the WARN Act. When employees are forced to take
on their employers, no one wins because the litigation costs are felt by
the employee, the employer, and society as a whole, in the form of
increased court costs to process the employee claims.
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly refused over the last
decade to resolve the splits between the circuit courts regarding
interpretation of an employee’s remedy under the Act, Congress has no
choice but to step in and resolve the problem. In order to make the
WARN Act more effective in carrying out its goal, Congress should
amend the WARN Act in three ways: (1) by designating the remedy
afforded to employees as a compensatory, make-whole remedy that
allows the employee to recover damages equal to the pay and benefits
that the employee would have earned absent the employer’s violation of
the WARN Act, (2) by including a broad definition of back pay that
includes all pay and non-ERISA benefits the employee would have
earned during the violation period and adopting the snapshot test to assist
employers in determining whether particular compensation or benefits are
included as back pay, and (3) by declaring that the calculation of back pay
will be based on the number of working days during the violation period.
In passing the WARN Act, Congress enacted an ambiguous statute
that has caused employers unnecessary litigation expense; it is therefore
up to Congress to endorse the interpretations adopted by the majority of
circuits by amending the WARN Act. Until the proposed amendments
are enacted, all employers, including DeShai, will continue to suffer the
consequences of the statutory ambiguities of the WARN Act. These
consequences will no doubt continue to have serious and detrimental
impacts on local economies, impacts that will in turn impact the national
economy, thus leaving no company immune from the effects of the
WARN Act.
TONYA M. CROSS
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